| ? They took this rather coldly.
Meanwhile, our progress in the air is increasingly disappointing.
With regard to the Italian Pact, I agree with what you write. Mussolini gives
us nothing more than the repetition of promises previously made and broken
by him, except for the withdrawal of troops from Libya, troops which were
probably originally sent there for their nuisance value. It has now become
clear that, as I expected, Mussolini continued his intervention in Spain after
the conversations in Rome had opened. He must be an optimist, indeed,
who believes that Mussolini will cease increasing that intervention now,
should it be required to secure Franco's victory.
As a diplomatic instrument the pact embodies a machinery which is likely to
be found very troublesome to work. It is not to come into force until after
the Italians leave Spain. It is almost certain, however, that many months will
elapse before that occurs, and since what is important is not the presence of
Mr. Churchill to Mr. Eden. 18.IV.38.
Mr. Eden to Mr. Churchill. 28.IV.38.
216
Italian infantry, but the assertions of their experts and the Germans, it will
be difficult to establish with certainty that the withdrawal has taken place.
But maybe some do not mind much about that.
Then there is the Italian position in Abyssinia, which, from what I hear, so
far from improving grows steadily worse. I am afraid that the moment we
are choosing for its recognition will not benefit our authority among the
many millions of the King's coloured subjects.
None the less I equally agree as to the need for caution in any attitude
taken up towards the agreement. After all, it is not an agreement yet, and it
would be wrong certainly for me to say anything which could be considered
as making its fruition more difficult. After all, this is precisely what I
promised I would do in my resignation speech and at Leamington.
The most anxious feature of the international situation, as I see it, is that
temporary relaxation of tension may be taken as a pretext for the relaxation
of national effort, which is already inadequate to the gravity of the times.
Hitler was watching the scene with vigilance. To him also the ultimate alignment of Italy in
a European crisis was important. In conference with his Chiefs of Staff at the end of April,
he was considering how to force the pace. Mussolini wanted a free hand against
A.A. attack, and regard it as a matter of extreme urgency, I consider the
scale of eighty 3.7-inch guns goes beyond what is justified, having regard to
other heavy needs. It is altogether out of proportion to lock up three
regiments of A.A. artillery, etc. (comprising 6,200 men) for the whole war in
Scapa. Scapa is no longer the base of the Grand Fleet, but only of three or
four principal vessels. Alternative harbours can be used by these. The
distance from Germany, 430 miles, is considerable. We must be very careful
not to dissipate our strength unduly in passive defence.
I approve, therefore, of the additional sixteenth 3.7-inch as a matter of the
highest urgency. But I think they should be erected by the Admiralty to
avoid the long delays and heavy charges of the War Office Ordnance Board.
The second twenty equipments should be considered in relation to the needs
of Malta, as well as to the aircraft factories in England. This applies still more
to the full scale of 3.7-inch guns, numbering forty-four. Their destination can
only be considered in relation to the future war need.
The light A.A. guns seem to be excessive, having regard to the heavy pompom
fire of the Fleet. The searchlights and balloons are most necessary, as
are also the two Fighter Squadrons. Do we not require a more powerful
R.D.F. station? And should there not be an additional R.D.F. station on the
mainland?
In this case the urgency of getting something into position counts far more
than making large-scale plans for 1940.
Let me have reduced proposals with estimates of time and money, but
without delaying action on the first instalments.
Also a report of the A.A. defences of Malta, and also of Chatham.
It was very pleasant to see the aircraft carrier Argus in the basin at
Portsmouth to-day. The boats of this vessel have been sent to the C.-in-C.,
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others. 20.IX.39.
First Lord to First Sea Lord and others. 21.IX.39.
554
Home Fleet, but no doubt they could easily be replaced, and various guns
could be mounted. We are told that modern aircraft require a larger deck to
fly on and off. In that case, would it not be well to build some aircraft
suitable for the ship, as these can be made much quicker than a new aircraft
carrier? We ought to commission Argus as soon as possible, observing that
the survivors of Courageous are available. Pray consider the steps that
should be taken to this end. I am told she is a very st and the night following.?
In Norway it appeared that Narvik was likely to be captured by us at any
moment, but Lord Cork was informed that in the light of the news from France
3
The Battle of France
The Second Week: Weygand
May 17 to May 24
58
no more reinforcements could be sent to him.
The battle crisis grew hourly in intensity. At the request of General Georges,
the British Army prolonged its defensive flank by occupying points on the
whole line from Douai to P?ronne, thus attempting to cover Arras, which was
a road centre vital to any southward retreat. That afternoon the Germans
entered Brussels. The next day they reached Cambrai, passed St. Quentin,
and brushed our small parties out of P?ronne. The French Seventh, the
Belgian, the British, and the French First Army all continued their withdrawal
to the Scheldt, the British standing along the Dendre for the day, and forming
the detachment ?Petreforce? (a temporary grouping of various units under
Major General Petre) for the defence of Arras.
At midnight (May 18?19) Lord Gort was visited at his headquarters by General
Billotte. Neither the personality of this French general nor his proposals, such
as they were, inspired confidence in his allies. From this moment the
possibility of a withdrawal to the coast began to present itself to the British
Commander-in-Chief. In his despatch published in March, 1941, he wrote:
?The picture was now [night of the 19thcause me great anxiety. I had understood that Randle
[factory
had been fully recognised by England and France. I told him I should
support such an idea if it were agreeable. The British public would be willing
to try all roads to an honourable peace. I think there should be a meeting of
three. Any agreement they reached would of course be submitted to the
League of Nations. It seems to me the only chance of avoiding the
destruction of Italy as a powerful and friendly factor in Europe. Even if it
failed, no harm would have been done, and at present we are heading for
an absolute smash.
506
MY NOTE ON THE FLEET AIR ARM
WRITTEN FOR SIR THOMAS INSKIP, MINISTER FOR THE CO-ORDINATION
OF DEFENCE, IN 1936
1. It is impossible to resist an admiral's claim that he must have complete control of, and
confidence in, the aircraft of the battle fleet, whether used for reconnaissance, gun-fire or
air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the Admiralty view must
prevail in all that is required to secure this result.
2. The argument that similar conditions obtain in respect of Army co-operation aircraft
cannot be countenanced. In one case the aircraft take flight from aerodromes and operate
under precisely similar conditions to those of normal independent air force action. Flight
from warships and action in connection with naval operations is a totally different matter.
One is truly an affair of cooperation only; the other an integral part of modern naval
operations.
3. A division must therefore be made between the air force controlled by the Admiralty and
that controlled by the Air Ministry. This division does not depend upon the type of the
undercarriage of the aircraft, nor necessarily the base from which it is flown. It depends
upon the function. Is it predominantly a naval function or not?
4. Most of these defence functions can clearly be assigned. For instance, all functions which
require aircraft of any description (whether with wheels, floats, or boats; whether
reconnaissance, spotters or fighters, bombers or torpedo seaplanes) to be carried regularly
in warships or in aircraft carriers, naturally fall to the naval sphere.
5. The question thus reduces itself to the assignment of any type operating over the sea
from shore bases. This again can only be decided in relation to the functions and
responsibilities placed upon the Navy. Aircraft borne afloat could discharge a considerable
function of trade protection. This would be especially true in the broad waters, where a
4 have been a great disappointment
so far this war. The question of their alternative uses ought to be
considered by the Admiralty. I expect they have a large number
of skilled ratings on board. Could I have a list of these ships, their
tonnage, speeds, etc. Could they not carry troops or stores while
plying on their routes?
* * * * *
My indignation at the denial of the Southern Irish ports mounted under these
pressures.
* * * * *
Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.
27.XII.40.
Prime Minister to First Lord.
29.XII.40.
Prime Minister to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
1.XII.40.
599
The straits to which we are being reduced by Irish action compel
a reconsideration of these subsidies [to Irelandthere has been a steady
improvement in imports. In January the Navy carried safely into
British harbours, despite U-boats and mines and the winter gales
and fog, considerably more than four -fifths of the peace -time
427
average for the three preceding years. When we consider the great
number of British ships which have been withdrawn for naval service
or for the transport of our armies across the Channel or of troop
convoys across the globe, there is nothing in these results? to put it
mildly? which should cause despondency or alarm.
428
The Fleet Returns to Scapa Flow ? Our Voyage Through the Minches ? ?Mines Reported in
the Fairway? ? An Air Alarm ? Improvements at Scapa ? Hitler's Plans as Now Known ?
Desperate Plight of Finland ? M. Daladier's Vain Efforts ? The Russo-Finnish Armistice
Terms ? New Dangers in Scandinavia ? ?Operation Royal Marine? ? The Fluvial Mines
Ready ? M. Daladier's Opposition ? The Fall of the Daladier Government ? My Letter to
the New Premier, M. Reynaud ? Meeting of Supreme War Council, March 28 ? Mr.
Chamberlain's Survey ? Decision to Mine the Norwegian Leads at Last ? Seven Months'
Delay ? Various Offensive Proposals and Devices ? Mr. Chamberlain's Speech of April 5,
1940 ? Signs of Impending German Action.
M ARCH 12 was the long-desired date for the reoccupation and use of Scapa as the main
base of the Home Fleet. I thought I would give myself the treat of being present on this
occasion in our naval affairs, and embarked accordingly in Admiral Forbes' flagship at the
Clyde.
The Fleet comprised five capital ships, a cruiser squadron, and perhaps a score of
destroyers. The twenty-hour voyage lay through the Minches. We were to pass the
Northern Straits at dawn and reach Scapa about noon. The Hood and other ships from
Rosyth, moving up the east coast, would be there some hours before us. The navigation of
the Minches is intricate, and the northern exit barely a mile wide. On every side are rocky
shores and reefs, and three U-boats were reported in these enclosed waters. We had to
proceed at high speed and by zigzag. All the usual peace-time lights were out. This was,
therefore, a task in navigation which the Navy keenly appreciated. However, just as we
were about to start after luncheon, the Master of the Fleet, navigating officer of the
flagship, on whom the prime direct responsibility lay, was suddenly stricken by influenza.
So a very young-looking lieutenant who was his assistant cam
29.X.40.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
30.X.40.
527
close-up information about the relative merits of the two armies.
I expect to have a good wire every day or so, telling us exactly
what is happening, as far as the Greeks will allow it.
There is no objection to two battalions going to Freetown,
pending their relief by the West African Brigade, after which they
can go on to Egypt. They are not to leave England until it is
agreed that the West African Brigade is to go to West Africa.
Both Crete and Malta come before Freetown in A.A. guns, and I
cannot approve of this diversion at the present time. Neither can
I agree to the diversion of a fighter squadron [for Freetown which deprives us of invaluable
resources [fifty Infantry tanks or ?I? tanksis limited, and largely scientific in its character. It is
concerned with the methods which can be invented or adopted or
discovered to enable the earth to control the air, to enable defence from the
ground to exercise control? indeed domination? upon airplanes high above
its surface. My experience is that in these matters, when the need is fully
explained by military and political authorities, Science is always able to
provide something. We were told that it was impossible to grapple with
submarines, but methods were found which enabled us to strangle the
submarines below the surface of the water, a problem not necessarily harder
than that of clawing down marauding airplanes. Many things were adopted
in the war which we were told were technically impossible, but patience,
perseverance, and, above all, the spur of necessity under war conditions,
made men's brains act with greater vigour, and Science responded to the
demands.
It is only in the twentieth century that this hateful conception of inducing
nations to surrender by terrorising the helpless civil population by
massacring the women and children has gained acceptance and
countenance among men. This is not the cause of any one nation. Every
country would feel safer if once it were found that the bombing airplane was
116
at the mercy of appliances directed from the earth, and the haunting fears
and suspicions which are leading nations nearer and nearer to another
catastrophe would be abated. We have not only to fear attacks upon our
civil population in our great cities, in respect of which we are more
vulnerable than any other country in the world, but also attacks upon the
dockyards and other technical establishments without which our Fleet, still
an essential factor in our defence, might be paralysed or even destroyed.
Therefore, it is not only for the sake of a world effort to eliminate one of the
worst causes of suspicion and of war, but as a means of restoring to us here
in Great Britain the old security of our island, that this matter should receive
and command the most vigorous thought of the greatest men in our country
and our Government, and should be pressed forward by every resource that
the science of Britain can apply and the wealth of the country can liberate.
On the very next day, the Ministerial changes recorded in the previous chapter took place
and Mr. Baldwin became Prime Minister. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Lord Swinton as he soon
afterwards beca
Presume he knows that British and French are fighting their way
to coast between Gravelines and Ostend inclusive, and that we
propose to give fullest support from Navy and Air Force during
hazardous embarkation. What can we do for him? Certainly we
cannot serve Belgium?s cause by being hemmed in and starved
out. Our only hope is victory, and England will never quit the war
whatever happens till Hitler is beat or we cease to be a State.
Trust you will make sure he leaves with you by aeroplane before
too late. Should our operation prosper and we establish [anof a battle squadron which the enemy heavy ships dare not
engage. Around this battle squadron the light forces will act. It is suggested that three
10,000-ton eight -inch-gun cruisers and two six -inch should form the cruiser squadron,
together with two flotillas of the strongest combat destroyers, a detachment of submarines,
and a considerable contingent of ancillary craft, including, if possible, depot ships, and a
fleet repair vessel.
(2) On the approved date the ?Catherine? Fleet would traverse the passage by night or day,
as judged expedient, using if desired smoke screens. The destroyers would sweep ahead of
the fleet, the mine-bumpers would precede the ?Rs,? and the cruisers and lighter vessels
would follow in their wake. All existing apparatus of paravanes and other precautions can
be added. It ought, therefore, to be possible to overcome the mining danger, and there are
no guns to bar the channel. A heavy attack from the air must be encountered by the
combined batteries of the Fleet.
Note: An aircraft carrier could be sent in at the same time and kept supplied with reliefs of
aircraft reaching it by flight.
PART III
It is not necessary to enlarge on the strategic advantages of securing the command of this
theatre. It is the supreme naval offensive open to the Royal Navy. The isolation of Germany
522
from Scandinavia would intercept the supplies of iron ore and food and all other trade. The
arrival of this Fleet in the theatre and the establishment of command would probably
determine the action of the Scandinavian States. They could be brought in on our side; in
which case a convenient base could be found capable of being supplied overland. The
difficulty is that until we get there, they do not dare; but the three months' oil supply
should give the necessary margin, and if the worst comes to the worst, it is not seen why
the Fleet should not return as it came. The presence of this Fleet in the theatre would hold
all enemy forces on the spot. They would not dare to send them on the trade routes,
except as a measure of despair. They would have to arm the whole northern shore against
bombardment, or possibly even, if the alliance of the Scandinavian Powers was obtained,
military descents. The influence of this movement upon Russia would be far-reaching, but
we cannot count on this.
Secrecy is essential, as surprise must play its full part. For this purpose the term
?Catherine? will always be used in speaking of the opehapter 1 - No Love Under the Wind and Moon
The fog has lightened due to the strong winds, but as time approaches, solitude lies by the stream. A mysterious song is heard from afar, seemingly from the Jiangnan province. A soft and graceful tune was played which carried across the lake?s surface under the cover of the mist. Once the song had finished, a small boat appeared. Within the boat were five girls who were singing and laughing, picking lotuses into the boat. The lyrics the girls sang were from the poem The Butterfly Loves the Flower, written by the Song poet Ouyang Xiu, the words sung matched what the girl was feeling inside; though only sixty words were sung, the season, time of day, place, scenery and the girl?s face, clothes, hair adornments, emotions were all described meticulously. The next part of the song is as if someone is narrating a scene, a love story, which is close at heart yet far away, but a love which isn?t yet exhausted.
Ouyang Xiu was in Jiangnan as a court official where he lived a leisurely lifestyle, doing as he pleased, absorbed in what he was doing (reading, writing etc.,). People of Song shouldn?t use their position to abuse the town?s people, but it is not forbidden to use poetry for leisure. As long as a line of poetry came out, as long as there is well water to accompany a song, as the Jiangnan spring comes and the willow buds, as lotuses are on the autumn lake, everything that follows is an Ou poem.
It was during the year when Southern Song was established, and when the South Lake became popular. It was near mid autumn, as lotus leaves began to decay, and when lotus pods were at their best. A song spread across the lake to a Taoist priestess?s ear. As she sat alone underneath a willow tree quietly, the night winds forced her to place an apricot yellow robe on. The winds managed to brush a piece of dirt on her neck. She hid her feelings, as ?a lonely heart like a string struggling to be untangled?. The song gradually moves away, the song is a verse of Ouyang Xiu?s Butterfly Loves a Flower. A light breeze carried two sentences; ?there are no lovers meeting under the wind and moon, the past is like a dream cut short?. The song comes to a rest. A smile came upon her lips.
She let out a sigh and raised a left hand revealing a bloody palm. ?What do you find so funny?? she mumbled to herself. She sang to herself, without understanding the regret and sorrow within the poem.
Standing about one hundred feet away from the pas the middle of April, the Soviet Government entered
into negotiations with the British and French Governments about the
necessary measures to be taken. The negotiations started then are not yet
concluded. It became clear some time ago that if there was any real desire
to create an efficient front of peaceable countries against the advance of
aggression, the following minimum conditions were imperative:
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of an
effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, of an exclusively
defensive character.
A guarantee on the part of Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of the
states of Central and Eastern Europe, including without exception all the
European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., against an attack by
aggressors.
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of a definite
agreement on the forms and extent of the immediate and effective
assistance to be rendered to one another and to the guaranteed states in
the event of an attack by aggressors.
The negotiations had come to a seemingly unbreakable deadlock. The Polish and Rumanian
Governments, while accepting the British guarantee, were not prepared to accept a similar
undertaking in the same form from the Russian Government. A similar attitude prevailed in
another vital strategic quarter? the Baltic States. The Soviet Government made it clear that
they would only adhere to a pact of mutual assistance if Finland and the Baltic States were
included in a general guarantee. All four countries now refused, and perhaps in their terror
would for a long time have refused, such a condition. Finland and Esthonia even asserted
that they would consider a guarantee extended to them without their assent as an act of
aggression. On the same day, May 31, Esthonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts
with Germany. Thus Hitler penetrated with ease into the frail defences of the tardy,
irresolute coalition against him.
288
The Threat to Danzig ? General Gamelin Invites Me to Visit the Rhine Front ? A Tour with
General Georges ? Some Impressions ? French Acceptance of the Defensive ? The
Position of Atomic Research ? My Note on Air Defence ? Renewed Efforts to Agree with
Soviet Russia ? Polish Obstruction ? The Military Conversations in Moscow ? Stalin's
Account to Me in 1942 ? A Record in Deceit ? Ribbentrop Invited to Moscow ? The
Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty ? The News Breaks upon the Worl the hundred
and fifty to two hundred aircraft, and the two hundred and fifty
thousand rifles, also anything else that is going? I consider we
were promised all the above, and more too. Not an hour should
be lost in raising these questions. ?Beg while the iron is hot.?
I am very pleased with this telegram [about the Cavalry Division
in Palestine while disarmament ought vigorously to be pursued
as the chief objective of the Government, a situation in which a great
country not a member of the League of Nations possesses the most
powerful army and perhaps the most powerful air force in Western Europe,
with probably a greater coefficient of expansion than any other air force
cannot be allowed to endure. The Liberal Party would feel bound to support
measures of national defence when clear proof was afforded of their
necessity. I cannot therefore agree that to increase our national armaments
is necessarily inconsistent with our obligations under the collective peace
system.
He then proceeded to deal at length with ?the question of private profits being made out of
the means of death,? and quoted a recent speech by Lord Halifax, Minister of Education,
who had said that the British people were ?disposed to regard the preparation of
instruments of war as too high and too grave a thing to be entrusted to any hands less
responsible than those of the State itself.? Sir Archibald Sinclair thought that there ought to
be national factories for dealing with the rapid expansion in air armaments, for which
expansion, he said, a case had been made out.
The existence of private armament firms had long been a bugbear to Labour and Liberal
99
minds, and it lent itself readily to the making of popular speeches. It was, of course, absurd
to suppose that at this time our air expansion, recognised as necessary, could be achieved
through national factories only. A large part of the private industry of the country was
urgently required for immediate adaptation and to reinforce our existing sources of
manufacture. Nothing in the speeches of the Opposition leaders was in the slightest degree
related to the emergency in which they admitted we stood, or to the far graver facts which
we now know lay behind it.
The Government majority for their part appeared captivated by Mr. Baldwin's candour. His
admission of having been utterly wrong, with all his sources of knowledge, upon a vital
matter for which he was responsible was held to be redeemed by the frankness with which
he declared his error and shouldered the blame. There was even a strange wave of
enthusiasm for a Minister who did not hesitate to say that he was wrong. Indeed, many
Conservative Members seemed angry with me for having brought their trusted leader to a
plight from which only his native manliness and honesty had extricated him; buon Thursday, saw the gunner in
question and had a rocket fired off. Moreover, it was the
Admiralty Committee over which I presided early in the year
which produced the idea of using these distress rockets. I am,
therefore, well acquainted with the subject. The Air Ministry, not
for the first time, spread replica louis vuitton wallets itself into very large demands, and,
using its priority, barged in heavily into other forms of not less
important production. I agree that P.A.C.8 rockets may be a good
interim defence against low-flying attack, but they have to take
their place in the general scheme. I thought myself about five
thousand a month would be sufficient, but I am willing to agree
to fifteen hundred a week, or six thousand a month. This figure
could be somewhat extended if the wire -recovery projects you
mention were further developed and proved an effective
economy.
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to General Ismay. 25.VIII.40.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air.
25.VIII.40.
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War. 25.VIII.40.
666
War Office have accepted from the War Cabinet the responsibility
of dealing with delayed -action bombs. This may become a feature
of the enemy attack. A number were thrown last night into the
City, causing obstruction. They may even try them on Whitehall!
It seems to me that energetic effort should be made to provide
sufficient squads to deal with this form of attack in the large
centres. The squads must be highly mobile, so as not to waste
men and material. They must move in motor lorries quickly from
one point to another. I presume a careful system of reporting all
unexploded bombs and the time at which they fell is in operation,
and that this information will be sent immediately to the delayedaction
section of Home Defence, which has no doubt already
been established, and also the various local branches. The
service, which is highly dangerous, must be considered
particularly honourable, and rewards should follow its successful
discharge.
I should be very glad to see your plans for the new section,
together with numbers, and it will also be interesting to have a
short account of the work done up to date and the methods
employed. I presume you are in touch with all the scientific
authorities you need.
On the other hand, I am asking the Air Ministry for information as
to their reciprocating this process on the enemy.
(General Ismay to see.)
I cannot feel you are justifiedwas violent and brave, the second son Cha He Tai [Chagatailines of
defence drawn up between Dover and London and Harwich and
London. Now that the coast is finished, there is no reason why
we should not develop these lines, which in no way detract from
the principle of vehement counter-attack.
But the most urgent matter is one or two modern six-inch to
shoot all German craft up to thirty-five thousand yards.
I am also endeavouring to obtain from United States at least a
pair of their sixteen-inch coast-defence weapons. These fire fortyfive
thousand yards, throwing a ton and a quarter, without being
super-charged. They should therefore be very accurate. General
Strong, United States Army, mentioned this to me as a promising
line. He thought, without committing his Government, that the
United States Army might be prepared to take a couple of these
guns and their carriages away from some of their twin batteries.
Let me know all details about these guns. It ought to be possible
to make the concrete foundation in three months, and I expect it
would take as long to get these guns over here. There are very
few ships that can carry them on their decks.
It becomes particularly urgent to attack the batteries on the
French shore. Yesterday?s photographs show guns being actually
hoisted up into position, and it will be wise to fire on them before
they are able to reply. There are quite enough guns in position
already. I trust, therefore, Erebus will not be delayed, as every
day our task will become harder.
It seems most necessary to damage and delay the development
of the hostile batteries in view of the fact that we are so far
behindhand with our own.
At the beginning of September our heavy-gun strength towards the sea was:
Prime Minister to General Ismay and First Sea Lord.
31.VIII.40.
276
These were soon to be further reinforced by two 13.5-inch guns from the old
battleship Iron Duke, which were being erected on railway mountings, and a
battery of four 5.5-inch guns from H.M.S. Hood. Many of these additional guns
were manned by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines.
Although still inferior in numbers to the enemy we thus had a powerful fire
concentration.
In addition one of the eighteen-inch howitzers I had saved after the First
World War and twelve twelve-inch howitzers were installed for engaging
enemy landings. All these were mobile and would have brought a terrible fire
on any landing-area.
* * * * *
As the months of July and August passed without any disaster, we settled
ourselvethe six battalions and the artillery of the Fifth Greek
Division.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
6.XI.40.
Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
7.XI.40.
533
Every effort should be made to rush arms or equipment to enable
a reserve division of Greeks to be formed in Crete. Rifles and
machine guns are quite sufficient in this case. To keep a Greek
division out of the battle on the Epirus front would be very bad,
and to lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces
there would be a crime.
It was time Mr. Eden should come home to report to us as he earnestly
desired. The following telegrams are self-explanatory:
All strongly of the opinion I should return home as rapidly as
possible in order to put whole position as seen from here before
you. Earnestly hope you will agree to this. Propose to leave
tomorrow morning. Perfectly prepared to fly back here if required
after I have seen you, but am convinced that this meeting
between us is most urgent. It is impossible to explain position
and plans fully by telegram.
Please reply urgently.
Assent was given, and the Secretary of State began his journey. The following
points were made in his simultaneous telegrams to me:
Conference [in Cairobring relative battleship
strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory.
Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in service in January. We
have already King George V, and hope to have Prince of Wales in
the line at the same time. These modern ships are, of course, far
better armoured, especially against air attack, than vessels like
Rodney and Nelson, designed twenty years ago. We have
recently had to use Rodney on transatlantic escort, and at any
time, when numbers are so small, a mine or a torpedo may alter
decisively the strength of the line of battle. We get relief in June,
when Duke of York will be ready, and shall be still better off at
the end of 1941, when Anson also will have joined. But these two
first-class modern 35,000-ton 3 fifteen-inch-gun German
battleships force us to maintain a concentration never previously
necessary in this war.
8. We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out of action for a
while, and anyway they are not so dangerous as if they were
manned by Germans. Perhaps they might be! We are indebted to
you for your help about the Richelieu and Jean Bart, and I
daresay that will be all right. But, Mr. President, as no one will
see more clearly than you, we have during these months to
consider for the first time in this war a fleet action in which the
enemy will have two ships at least as good as our two best and
only two modern ones. It will be impossible to reduce our
strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey,
and indeed the whole position in the Eastern Basin, depends
upon our having a strong fleet there. The older, unmodernised
battleships will have to go for convoy. Thus, even in the
battleship class we are in full extension.
9. There is a second field of danger: The Vichy Government may,
either by joining Hitler?s New Order in Europe or through some
manoeuvre, such as forcing us to attack an expedition
despatched by sea against the Free French Colonies, find an
excuse for ranging with the Axis Powers the very considerable
undamaged naval forces still under its control. If the French Navy
were to join the Axis, the control of West Africa would pass
555
immediately into their hands, with the gravest consequences to
our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic,
and also affecting Dakar and of course thereafter South America.
10. A third sphere of danger is in the Far East. Here it seems
clear that Japan is thrusting southward tthis morning that you had instructed
General Gort to continue to carry out the Weygand plan. General
Weygand now informs me that, according to a telegram from
General Blanchard, the British Army had carried out, on its own
initiative, a retreat of twenty-five miles towards the ports at a
time when our troops moving up from the south are gaining
ground towards the north, where they were to meet their allies.
This action of the British Army is in direct opposition to the formal
orders renewed this morning by General Weygand. This retreat
has naturally obliged General Weygand to change all his
75
arrangements, and he is compelled to give up the idea of closing
the gap and restoring a continuous front. I need not lay any
stress upon the gravity of the possible consequences.
Up to this time General Weygand had been counting on General Fr?re?s army
advancing northward on Amiens, Albert, and P?ronne. They had, in fact, made
no noticeable progress, and were still forming and assembling. The following
are my replies to M. Reynaud:
25.V.40.
My telegram last night told you all we knew over here, and we
have still heard nothing from Lord Gort to contradict it. But I
must tell you that a staff officer has reported to the War Office
confirming the withdrawal of the two divisions from the Arras
region, which your telegram to me mentioned. General Dill, who
should be with Lord Gort, has been told to send a staff officer by
air at the earliest moment. As soon as we know what has
happened, I will report fully. It is clear, however, that the
Northern Army is practically surrounded and that all its
communications are cut except through Dunkirk and Ostend.
25.V.40.
We have every reason to believe that Gort is still persevering in
southward move. All we know is that he has been forced by the
pressure on his western flank, and to keep communication with
Dunkirk for indispensable supplies, to place parts of two divisions
between himself and the increasing pressure of the German
armoured forces, which in apparently irresistible strength have
successively captured Abb?ville and Boulogne, are menacing
Calais and Dunkirk, and have taken St. Omer. How can he move
southward and disengage his northern front unless he throws out
this shield on his right hand? Nothing in the movements of the
B.E.F. of which we are aware can be any excuse for the
abandonment of the strong pressure of your northward move
across the Somme, which we trust will developtill after the end of 1940. Beware lest these fortification
people and other departmentals do not consume our strength upon longscale
developments which cannot mature till after the climax which settles
our fate.
I see the departments full of loose fat, following on undue starvation. It
would be much better from your point of view to come along with your
alguazils as critics upon wasteful exhibitions, rather than delaying action.
Don't hamper departments acting in a time of crisis; give them the
responsibility; but call them swiftly to account for any failure in thrift.
I hope you will not mind me writing to you upon this subject, because I feel
just as strongly about the husbanding of the money power as I do about the
war effort, of which it is indeed an integral part. In all these matters you can
count on my support, and also, as the head of a spending department, upon
my submission to searching superintendence.
* * * * *
In every war in which the Royal Navy has claimed the command of the seas, it has had to
pay the price of exposing immense targets to the enemy. The privateer, the raiding cruiser,
and above all the U-boat, have in all the varying forms of war exacted a heavy toll upon the
life-lines of our commerce and food-supply. A prime function of defence has, therefore,
always been imposed upon us. From this fact the danger arises of our being driven or
subsiding into a defensive naval strategy and habit of mind. Modern developments have
aggravated this tendency. In the two Great Wars, during parts of which I was responsible
for the control of the Admiralty, I have always sought to rupture this defensive obsession
by searching for forms of counter-offensive. To make the enemy wonder where he is going
to be hit next may bring immeasurable relief to the process of shepherding hundreds of
convoys and thousands of merchantmen safely into port. In the First World War I hoped to
find in the Dardanelles, and later in an attack upon Borkum and other Frisian islands, the
means of regaining the initiative, and forcing the weaker naval power to study his own
problems rather than ours. Called to the Admiralty again in 1939, and as soon as
immediate needs were dealt with and perils warded off, I could not rest content with the
policy of ?convoy and blockade.? I sought earnestly for a way of attacking Germany by
naval means.
First and foremost gleamed the Baltic. The command of the Baltic by a British Fleet carried
with it possimust be driven forward to the utmost limit.
The full order for the thirty-five thousand vehicles should be
placed in the United States without further delay. Meanwhile the
inquiry into the scale required by the War Office is to proceed.
I was the author of this plan of pow-wow, but the Greek
complication seems to be serious. It will be of enormous
advantage to us if Germany delays or shrinks from an attack on
Bulgaria through Greece. I should not like those people in Greece
to feel that, for the sake of what is after all only a parade, we
Prime Minister to General Ismay, and others concerned. 24.XI.40
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
24.XI.40
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary.
27.XI.40.
710
had pressed them into action which could be cited by Germany as
a justification for marching. The only thing to do is to put the
meeting off until we can see a little more clearly on this very
confused chessboard of Eastern Europe.
I think the Dominions should be told that we are waiting for the
Greek situation to define itself more clearly, and that this ought
not to take more than a fortnight. I do not think it is necessary to
give any reasons to the Allied Governments, except to assure
them that the delay will be short.
[Reference: Draft telegram to General Metaxas.said they picked up
no fewer than eighty German machines brought down over the
land alone. This gives us a very good line for our own purposes. I
must say I am a little impatient about the American scepticism.
The event is what will decide all.
* * * * *
On August 20 I could report to Parliament:
The enemy is of course far more numerous than we are. But our
new production already largely exceeds his, and the American
production is only just beginning to flow in. Our bomber and
fighter strengths now, after all this fighting, are larger than they
have ever been. We believe that we should be able to continue
the air struggle indefinitely and as long as the enemy pleases,
and the longer it continues, the more rapid will be our approach
first towards that parity, and then into that superiority, in the air,
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air. 21.VIII.40.
321
upon which in large measure the decision of the war depends.
Up till the end of August, Goering did not take an unfavourable view of the air
conflict. He and his circle believed that the English ground organisation and
aircraft industry and the fighting strength of the R.A.F. had already been
severely damaged. They estimated that since August 8 we had lost 1115
aircraft against the German losses of 467. But of course each side takes a
hopeful view, and it is in the interest of their leaders that they should. There
was a spell of fine weather in September, and the Luftwaffe hoped for
decisive results. Heavy attacks fell upon our aerodrome installations round
London, and on the night of the 6th, sixty-eight aircraft attacked London,
followed on the 7th by the first large-scale attack of about three hundred. On
this and succeeding days, during which our anti-aircraft guns were doubled in
numbers, very hard and continuous air fighting took place over the capital,
and the Luftwaffe were still confident through their overestimation of our
losses. But we now know that the German Naval Staff, in anxious regard for
their own interests and responsibilities, wrote in their diary on September 10:
There is no sign of the defeat of the enemy?s air force over
Southern England and in the Channel area, and this is vital to a
further judgment of the situation. The preliminary attacks by the
Luftwaffe have indeed achieved a noticeable weakening of the
enemy?s fighter defence, so that considerable German fighter
superiority can be assumed over the English area. However ? we
have was the most humane, when he thought about it, Huo Dou did not resemble any of the four princes.
Qiu Chuji said, ?I?m afraid that a man of his stature coming to create havoc here has an ulterior motive. His kung fu originates from Western Tibet; he arrived in the central plains at the beginning of the year. He wounded the three heroes of Henan, and later on he single-handedly killed the seven Lords of Lanzhou. His name was spread widely throughout the land, we didn?t predict that he would have the nerve to come to our sect and cause trouble. The other Tibetan monk is called Da?erba; he has supernatural strength, and his kung fu is from the same school as Huo Dou. It appears that he is the senior apprentice brother. He is a monk, of course he hasn?t come here to get married; he?s here to aid Huo Dou.
When the rest of the evil men heard the two were coming, they remembered the matter of dueling for marriage. Years ago, in front of a crowd of people, Li Mochou had said the tomb contained mountains of treasures, and had countless kung fu manuscripts and manuals; saying there was the formulae to the ?Eighteen Subduing Dragon Palms?, the ?Solitary Yang Finger? and numerous others. Although the crooks and scoundrels were unsure, they thought that if they went up to the mountain and opened up the tomb, they would be able to get a share of the spoils. About one hundred or so of them came up the mountain. Originally our ?Big Dipper Formation? could have easily repelled them away from the foot of our mountain, not allowing them to come through and teach them not to take one step into Chongyang Palace. We were resisting them when the misunderstanding occurred; there is no need to say anymore.?
Guo Jing felt very guilty and apologetic, and wanted to say a few words of apology. Qiu Chuji waved his hand and laughed, ?Letting a laugh out rids your worries and the moon is still in the sky above the western lake. The halls and buildings are just objects; human possessions mean nothing, so why worry about them? You have honed your martial arts for the last ten years, could it be that you do not understand the meaning of this??
Guo Jing laughed and said, ?Yes!?
Qiu Chuji laughed and said, ?Actually when I saw the back courtyard being burned down to the ground, I was very angry and furious, but after a while I calmed down. Compared to how calm apprentice brother Ma was, I am nowhere as enlightened as he is.?
Guo Jing said, ?You can?t blame yourself for getting angrtroops know they are cutting their way home to
Blighty. Never was there such a spur for fighting. We shall give
you all that the Navy and Air Force can do. Anthony Eden is with
me now and joins his good wishes to mine.
[Enclosure.the Ukraine, which means an
invasion of Russian territory. All along the whole of this eastern front you
can see that the major interests of Russia are definitely engaged, and
therefore it seems you could fairly judge that they would pool their interests
with other countries similarly affected.
* * * * *
If you are ready to be an ally of Russia in time of war, which is the supreme
test, the great occasion of all, if you are ready to join hands with Russia in
the defence of Poland, which you have guaranteed, and of Rumania, why
should you shrink from becoming the ally of Russia now, when you may by
that very fact prevent the breaking-out of war? I cannot understand all these
refinements of diplomacy and delay. If the worst comes to the worst, you
are in the midst of it with them, and you have to make the best of it with
them. If the difficulties do not arise, well, you will have had the security in
the preliminary stages.
* * * * *
284
His Majesty's Government have given a guarantee to Poland. I was
astounded when I heard them give this guarantee. I support it, but I was
astounded by it, because nothing that had happened before led one to
suppose that such a step would be taken. I want to draw the attention of
the Committee to the fact that the question posed by Mr. Lloyd George ten
days ago and repeated today has not been answered. The question was
whether the General Staff was consulted before this guarantee was given as
to whether it was safe and practical to give it, and whether there were any
means of implementing it. The whole country knows that the question has
been asked, and it has not been answered. That is disconcerting and
disquieting.
* * * * *
Clearly Russia is not going to enter into agreements unless she is treated as
an equal, and not only is treated as an equal, but has confidence that the
methods employed by the Allies? by the peace front? are such as would be
likely to lead to success. No one wants to associate himself with
indeterminate leadership and uncertain policies. The Government must
realise that none of these states in Eastern Europe can maintain themselves
for, say, a year's war unless they have behind them the massive, solid
backing of a friendly Russia, joined to the combination of the Western
Powers. In the main, I agree with Mr. Lloyd George that if there is to be an
effective eastern front? an eastern peace front, or a war front as it might
become? it can be set up only with the eff In practice
much inconvenience would arise if this theoretical equality had many
First Lord to Secretary. 4.X.39.
First Lord to Second Sea Lord, Parliamentary
Secretary and Secretary.
7.X.39.
First Lord to Secretary. 7.X.39.
First Lord to Second Sea Lord and others concerned
and Secretary.
14.X.39.
584
examples. Each case must be judged on its merits, from the point of view of
smooth administration. I cannot see any objection to Indians serving on
H.M. ships where they are qualified and needed, or, if their virtues so
deserve, rising to be Admirals of the Fleet. But not too many of them,
please.
I see no reason to suspend these enlistments or bar the Navy door to the
Dominions in time of war. Most particularly am I concerned with
Newfoundland, about which I have given special directions. The
Newfoundlanders are certainly not to be ?left to find their own way to this
country? from Newfoundland. Care and pains are to be taken to recruit, train
and convey to the United Kingdom as many as possible. I hope we shall get
one thousand. I understand this is in progress, and let me have a report
saying exactly what is being done in Newfoundland.
With regard to the other Dominions, suitable enlistments should be accepted
whether for hostilities only or for permanent service. These ratings can be
trained at the naval ports in the Dominions: at Sydney, at Halifax and
Esquimalt, and at Simonstown. Opportunity will then be given to transport
the men in batches to this country or draft them on to His Majesty's ships
visiting the Dominions.
Pray let a scheme on these lines be put forward with a view to surmounting
the difficulties.
?Salmon's? War Patrol Narrative
I am in entire accord with the Second Sea Lord's Minute of yesterday. I shall
be most willing to concur in the promotion and honours proposed, both to
the officers and to the men. I await the proposals of the Sea Lords in
respect of the promotion. Naval Secretary should prepare submissions for
the Honours to the King, and, if possible, these should be published, both as
to officers and men, before the Salmon sails again. Perhaps His Majesty
would like himself to see the officer (Lieutenant-Commander Bickford), and
conclude the audience by pinning on the D.S.O. Naval Secretary might find
out what they think about this at the Palace. It seems probable that similar,
though not necessarily the same, awards will be required in the case of the
Commander of the Ursula, and hhave to keep in
Palestine:
6 battalions of infantry
9 regiments of yeomanry
8 battalions of Australian infantry
? the whole probably more than twenty thousand men. This is
the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has
been persisted in for some years. Should the war go heavily into
Egypt, all these troops will have to be withdrawn, and the
position of the Jewish colonists will be one of the greatest
danger. Indeed I am sure that we shall be told we cannot
withdraw these troops, though they include some of our best,
and are vitally needed elsewhere. If the Jews were properly
armed, our forces would become available, and there would be
no danger of the Jews attacking the Arabs, because they are
entirely dependent upon us and upon our command of the seas. I
think it is little less than a scandal that at a time when we are
fighting for our lives these very large forces should be
immobilised in support of a policy which commends itself only to
a section of the Conservative Party.
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lord Lloyd). 28.VI.40.
176
I had hoped you would take a broad view of the Palestine
situation, and would make it an earnest objective to set the
British garrison free. I could certainly not associate myself with
such an answer as you have drawn up for me. I do not at all
admit that Arab feeling in the Near East and India would be
prejudiced in the manner you suggest. Now that we have the
Turks in such a friendly relationship, the position is much more
secure.
* * * * *
For the first time in a hundred and twenty-five years a powerful enemy was
now established rolex ladies across the narrow waters of the English Channel. Our reformed
Regular Army, and the larger but less well-trained Territorials, had to
be organised and deployed to create an elaborate system of defences, and to
stand ready, if the invader came, to destroy him ? for there could be no
escape. It was for both sides ?Kill or Cure.? Already the Home Guard could be
included in the general framework of defence. On June 25, General Ironside,
Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, exposed his plans to the Chiefs of Staff.
They were, of course, scrutinised with anxious care by the experts, and I
examined them myself with no little attention. On the whole they stood
approved. There were three main elements in this early outline of a great
future plan: first, an entrenched ?crust? on the probable invasion beaches of
the coast, whose defendseem very insufficient. What is
going to be done to increase them?
2. In view of the torpedoing of the Glasgow by a seaplane while
at anchor, ought not ships at anchor to be protected by nets at
short range? I gather this was the Italian method at Taranto, but
at the moment of the attack they had taken them off. Pray let me
have a note on this.
ARMY ORGANISATION
Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production.
3.XII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
4.XII.40.
714
I understand that you are asking for another big call-up shortly.
The papers talk about a million men. This forces me to examine
the distribution of the men you have. According to your paper,
twenty-seven British divisions are credited to Expeditionary Force
and Middle East. These divisions are accounted for at 35,000 men
each, to cover corps, army and line of communication troops,
etc., plus 70,000 security troops in M.E.
2. The approved establishment of a British division at the present
time is 15,500 men. It comprises only nine battalions with an
establishment of 850, i.e., about 7500. The establishment of all
battalions comprises a considerable proportion of servicing
elements, and I doubt whether the rifle and machine-gun
strength ? i.e., fighting strength ? amounts to more than 750.
Thus the total number of men who actually fight in the infantry of
a British division is 6750. This makes the fighting infantry of
twenty-seven divisions, in what used to be called bayonet or rifle
strength, 182,250. It used to be said that the infantry was ?the
staple of the Army,? to which all other branches were ancillary.
This has certainly undergone some modification under new
conditions, but none the less it remains broadly true. The
structure of a division is built round its infantry of nine battalions,
with a battery to each battalion, the necessary proportion of
signallers and sappers, the battalion, brigade, and divisional
transport, and some additional elements, the whole being
constituted as an integral and self-contained unit of 15,500 men.
3. When we look at the division as a unit, we find that twentyseven
divisions at 15,500 official establishment require no less
than 1,015,000 men. This gives an actual burden of 35,000 men
for every divisional unit of 15,500 men, the units themselves
being already fully self-contained. Nearly 20,000 men have
therefore to be accounted for for each division of the E.F. or M.E.
over and above the full approved establisto the attacked area.
6. Parachutists, Fifth-Columnists, and enemy motor-cyclists who
may penetrate or appear in disguise in unexpected places must
be left to the Home Guard, reinforced by special squads. Much
thought must be given to the [enemyconquered locally, it would be natural that events should
follow the above course. But if America continued neutral, and we
were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by
a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set
up.
Although President is our best friend, no practical help has
[reached usof individuals. I
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to C.A.S. and General Ismay. 28.VIII.40.
Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New
Zealand.
11.VIII.40.
425
do not think myself that Japan will declare war unless Germany
can make a successful invasion of Britain. Once Japan sees that
Germany has either failed or dares not try, I look for easier times
in the Pacific. In adopting against the grain a yielding policy
towards Japanese threats, we have always in mind your interests
and safety.
Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us, her first objective
outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies.
Evidently the United States would not like this. What they would
do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support, but their
main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the
Japanese Admiralty. In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war
we should, of course, defend Singapore, which if attacked ?
which is unlikely ? ought to stand a long siege. We should also be
able to base on Ceylon a battle cruiser and a fast aircraft-carrier,
which with all the Australian and New Zealand cruisers and
destroyers, which would return to you, would act as a very
powerful deterrent upon the hostile raiding cruisers.
We are about to reinforce with more first-class units the Eastern
Mediterranean Fleet. This fleet could, of course, at any time be
sent through the Canal into the Indian Ocean, or to relieve
Singapore. We do not want to do this, even if Japan declares
war, until it is found to be vital to your safety. Such a
transference would entail the complete loss of the Middle East,
and all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be
gone. We must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the near future,
and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is needed to help in repelling
them. If these attacks succeed, the Eastern Fleet would have to
leave the Mediterranean either through the Canal or by Gibraltar.
In either case a large part of it would be available for your
protection. We hope, however, to maintain ourselves in Egypt,
and to keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase
of an Anglo-Japanese war, should that occur. No one can lay
down beforehand what is going to happen. We must just weigh
events from day to day, and use our available resources to the
utmost.
426
A final question arises: whether Japan, having declared war,
would attempt to invade Australia or New was a clever planner, the third prince Wo Kuo Tai [Ogedaiweapon can be
provided with ammunition, predictors, and other aids which
realise an accuracy of hitting three or four times as great as that
which now exists, the ground will have taken a long step towards
the re-conquest of the air. The Navy will regain much of its old
freedom of movement and power to take offensive action. And
the Army will be able to land at many points without the risk of
being ?Namsossed.? 1 We must, therefore, regard the whole
sphere of R.D.F. [Radarsuccessful offensive in Libya. Pray, after an examination of
whole problem with Wavell and Smuts, do not hesitate to make
proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors,
and ask for any further aid you require from here, including
aircraft and anti-aircraft [batterieswas
to get Russia out of Europe, to gain time, and to complete the German
armaments.? 7
* * * * *
Hitler's judgment had been once more decisively vindicated. The German General Staff was
utterly abashed. Once again the Fuehrer had been right, after all. He with his genius and
intuition alone had truly measured all the circumstances, military and political. Once again,
as in the Rhineland, the Fuehrer's leadership had triumphed over the obstruction of the
German military chiefs. All these generals were patriotic men. They longed to see the
Fatherland regain its position in the world. They were devoting themselves night and day to
every process that could strengthen the German forces. They, therefore, felt smitten in
their hearts at having been found so much below the level of the event, and in many cases
their dislike and their distrust of Hitler were overpowered by admiration for his
commanding gifts and miraculous luck. Surely here was a star to follow, surely here was a
guide to obey. Thus did Hitler finally become the undisputed master of Germany, and the
path was clear for the great design. The conspirators lay low, and were not betrayed by
their military comrades.
* * * * *
It may be well here to set down some principles of morals and action which may be a guide
in the future. No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. The facts
may be unknown at the time, and estimates of them must be largely guesswork, coloured
by the general feelings and aims of whoever is trying to pronounce. Those who are prone
by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure
problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign Power,
have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their
heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On
the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a
practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good
will! Religion and virtue alike lend their sanctions to meekness and humility, not only
between men but between nations. How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands!
How many misunderstandings which led to wars could have been removed by temporising!
How often have countries fought cruel wars and then after a few years of peace found
themselves not only friends but allies!
in the Palatinate.
General Keitel communicates the facts at 1.45. He drives to the
Reichskanzlei at 10 o'clock. I follow at 10.15 to give him the old
draft, ?Prepare Case Otto.? 13.00 hours, General K. [Keitelto the Chiefs of the Staff for C.-in-C. Home Forces,
adding: ?I consider that fog is the gravest danger, as it throws
both air forces out of action, baffles our artillery, prevents
organised naval attack, and specially favours the infiltration
tactics by which the enemy will most probably seek to secure his
lodgments. Should conditions of fog prevail, the strongest
possible air barrage must be put down upon the invasion ports
during the night and early morning. I should be glad to be
advised of the proposed naval action by our flotillas, both in
darkness and at dawn: (a) if the fog lies more on the English
than the French side of the Channel; (b) if it is uniform on both
sides.
?Are we proposing to use radio aids to navigation?
?Prolonged conditions of stand -by under frequent air
bombardment will be exhausting to the enemy. Nonetheless, fog
is our foe.?
In spite of all the danger it was important not to wear the men out.
Inquire from the C.O.S. Committee whether in view of the rough
weather Alert Number 1 might not be discreetly relaxed to the
next grade.
Report to me.
Prime Minister to Colonel Jacob. 16.IX.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
18.IX.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
18.IX.40.
456
Make inquiries whether there is no way in which a sheet of
flaming oil can be spread over one or more of the invasion
harbours. This is no more than the old fire-ship story, with
modern improvements, that was tried at Dunkirk in the days of
the Armada. The Admiralty can surely think of something.
The De Wilde ammunition is of extreme importance. At Number
11 Group the bombing of its factory was evidently considered a
great blow. I can quite understand the output dropping to 38,000
rounds in the week while you are moving from Woolwich and
getting reinstated, but I trust it will revive again. Pray let me
know your future forecast for the next four weeks. If there is
revival in prospect, we might perhaps draw a little upon our
reserve.
I must show you the comments mad |
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